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Introduction. 
 
More than three dozen states around the world take part in censoring what their citizens 
can see and do on the Internet.  This practice is increasingly widespread, with extensive 
filtering regimes in place in China, Iran, Burma (Myanmar), Syria, and Uzbekistan.   
Censorship using technological filters is often coupled with restrictive laws related to 
what the press can publish, opaque surveillance practices, and severe penalties for people 
who break the state’s rules of using the Internet.  This trend has been emerging since at 
least 2002. 
 
As Internet use overall and the practice of online censorship grow, heads of state and 
their representatives have been gathering to discuss the broad topic of “Internet 
governance” at a series of high-profile, global meetings.  These meetings have taken the 
form of periodic World Summits on the Information Society and, more recently, meetings 
of the Internet Governance Forum.  The widespread practice of blocking citizens from 
accessing certain information on the Internet from within a given state offers a point of 
engagement for the Internet governance debate that takes place at these summits and 
forums.  Those who have participated in and lead these global efforts—the World 
Summit on Information Society’s planners, the members of the United Nations ICT Task 
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  1Force, the members of the United Nations’ Working Group on Internet Governance, the 
Internet Governance Forum’s leaders—have by and large avoided this matter of Internet 
filtering.  These influential meetings could profitably be focused on this issue in order, at 
a minimum, to establish a set of principles and best practices related to Internet filtering.   
 
The reason that the Internet filtering issue is not at the top of the agenda for these global 
discussions may seem obvious.  On a superficial level, this topic is an unattractive 
candidate for the Internet governance decision-makers to take up.  Diplomatic niceties 
make hard conversations about divisive issues unpleasant.  A serious discussion of 
Internet filtering would dredge up thorny topics like free expression, privacy, national 
security, international enforcement, and state sovereignty—issues on which states are 
likely to disagree vehemently.   
 
But in so doing, the Internet governance debate might take on new life and importance.  It 
might, in the process, engage more stakeholders in the conversation in meaningful ways.  
It could focus discussion on the core problems related to the divergence of views among 
states as to what a “good” Internet looks like.  It would put in relief the jurisdictional 
issues related to every country in the world sharing a single, unitary, public network of 
networks, far more powerful than any such network that has come before, with the power 
to bring people together and to divide them—while also acknowledging the fact that 
states can and do exert power over what their citizens do on this network.  It could help 
situate local conversations about issues like Network Neutrality into a global context.  It 
would prompt an examination of whether any single set of rules might serve to address 
concerns related to content on the Internet.  And, in the process, it would encourage states 
to come clean about the lengths they are willing to go to block their citizens from 
accessing information online.  At best, such a discussion would bring the issue of state-
based Internet censorship into the spotlight and might, in the process, lead some states to 
reform their Internet filtering practices so as to become more open and transparent. 
 
1.0  The Internet Governance Debate. 
 
  2No one is quite sure what the Internet governance debate is all about, exactly.  Since the 
round of preparatory conferences leading up to the first meeting of the World Summit on 
Information Society (WSIS) in December, 2003, the net has buzzed with a mixture of 
fear, mistrust, conspiracy theories, posturing, and horse-trading.  Most people who have 
involved themselves in the law and policy in this area are certain that Internet 
Governance is quite important.  And surely, it is.  But points of orientation—handholds—
in the debate are elusive, beyond the set of abstract principles set forth at the end of the 
first WSIS gathering.  Consider that the initial efforts of the United Nations’ Working 
Group on Internet Governance, ably chaired by veteran Swiss diplomat Markus Kummer, 
were oriented toward coming up with a definition of Internet governance—a year and a 
half after the first WSIS meeting.  Since that time, a useful conversation has ensued, but 
the topics on the agenda have largely revolved around perennial issues, without 
substantial resolution.  The Internet Governance Forum surely plays an important role in 
the global discussion of this topic, but it alone is not sufficient to resolve important 
differences in how the Internet is, in fact, governed, locally and globally.   
 
The problem is not that there is a shortage of candidates worthy of the attention of the 
many capable minds focused on Internet governance.
1  The primary lightening rod for 
Internet governance discussions continues to be issues related to the management of 
Internet resources, including the domain name system and related policy issues. 
Discussion of the beleaguered Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN) continues to play a central role.  While deeply flawed from a structural 
perspective and still much in need of overhaul, ICANN occupies an arcane bit of turf—
essentially, the port allocation business—that matters very little to most users of the 
Internet, particularly in a world in which most people find Internet resources through 
search engines and, increasingly, mobile devices and applications.
2  Within the context of 
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  3the Internet Governance Forum of 2009, meeting in Egypt, the first substantive panel of 
the event is devoted to traditional ICANN-related matters such as the transition from 
IPv4 to IPv6 and the addition of new top-level domains (TLDs).  Possibilities for 
consideration other than ICANN reform and these highly specific technical issues, each 
more important to the end users of the Internet and their sovereigns, have included a fund 
for developing countries to build Internet infrastructure, the quandary of what to do about 
spam, and a cluster of problems ordinarily considered intellectual property concerns.    
 
Internet filtering is a better candidate for consideration and focus by the world’s heads of 
state and their designees than these traditional “Internet governance” topics.  While it 
raises a wide array of issues, a discussion of Internet filtering would hone in on whether 
states actually want their citizens to have full access to the Internet or not.  It would help 
guide a public conversation about what is truly most important about having access to the 
Internet and the extent to which states place a premium, if at all, on the global flow of 
information.  Without collective action, the Internet will likely continue to become 
balkanized into a series of local networks, each governed by local laws, technologies, 
markets, and norms.  As Jonathan Zittrain has noted, we may be headed toward a 
localized version of the Internet, governed in each instance by local laws.
3  If such a 
version of the Internet is inevitably part of our future, perhaps there is a way to embrace it 
that can preserve elements of the network that are the most important.  And if the free and 
open, truly “world wide” Web is what we are after, intervention may be needed to 
preserve it. 
 
2.0  The Internet Filtering Problem. 
 
The fact that extensive Internet filtering occurs around the world is well-documented.   
Through a collaborative research effort called the OpenNet Initiative,
4 the Citizen Lab at 
the University of Toronto, the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard 
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  4University, and the SecDev Group (formerly, the Advanced Network Research Group at 
the University of Cambridge and the Oxford Internet Institute) are together comparing the 
Internet filtering practices of a series of states in a systematic, methodologically rigorous 
fashion.  A primary goal of our research is to reach useful substantive conclusions about 
the nature and extent of Internet filtering in roughly 70 states and to compare practices 
across regions of the world.  The OpenNet Initiative has released extensive reports that 
document and provide context for Internet filtering, previously reported anecdotally, in 
each of states that we have studied closely.  Our reports released to date have focused on 
states in the Middle East and North Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia, where the 
world’s most extensive filtering takes place, though research also covers states in every 
region of the world, including North America and Western Europe. 
 
Filtering implementations (and their respective scopes and levels of effectiveness) vary 
widely among the countries we have studied.  China, as documented in a number of 
studies and supported by the OpenNet Initiative’s findings, institutes by far the most 
intricate filtering regime in the world, with blocking occurring at multiple levels of the 
network and covering content that spans a wide range of topic areas.  Though its filtering 
program is widely discussed, Singapore, by contrast, blocks access to only a handful of 
sites, each pornographic in nature.  Most other states that we are studying implement 
filtering regimes that fall between the poles of China and Singapore, each with significant 
variation from one to the next.  These filtering regimes can be understood only in the 
political, legal, religious and social context in which they arise.   
 
Internet filtering occurs in different ways in different parts of the world.  Some states 
implement a software application developed by one of a small handful of United States-
based technology providers.  Burma, in the first incarnation of its filtering regime, has 
used an open source product for filtering, called DansGuardian.  Others rely less on 
technology solutions and more on “soft controls.”  Sometimes the filtering regime is 
supported explicitly by the state’s legal code; in other cases, the filtering regime is carried 
out through a national security authority, or just presumed to be permissible.  The content 
blocked spans a wide range of social, religious, and political information.  Our studies 
  5have combined a review of whether individual citizens could access sites in a “global 
basket” of bellwether sites to test in every jurisdiction across a variety of sensitive areas – 
akin to a stock index sorted by sector—as well as a list of Web sites likely to be sensitive 
in some categories only in some countries.   
 
2.1  Extent, Character, and Locus of Filtering. 
 
More than three dozen states around the world practice technical Internet filtering of 
various sorts.
5  The number is growing over time.  Those states that do filter have 
established a network of laws and technical measures to carry out substantial amounts of 
filtering that could allow the practice to become further embedded in their political and 
cultural environments.  Web content is constantly changing, of course, and no state we 
have yet studied, even China, seems able to carry out its Web filtering in a 
comprehensive manner, i.e. consistently blocking access to a range of sites meeting 
specified criteria. China appears to be the most nimble at responding to the shifting Web, 
likely reflecting a devotion of the most resources to the filtering enterprise.   
 
A state wishing to filter its citizens’ access to the Internet has several initial options: DNS 
filtering, IP filtering, or URL filtering.
6  Most states with advanced filtering regimes 
implement URL filtering, as it can avoid even more drastic overfiltering or underfiltering 
situations presented by the other choices and discussed below (“Filtering and 
Overbreadth”).
7  To implement URL filtering, a state must first identify where to place 
the filters; if the state directly controls the ISP(s), the answer is clear.  Otherwise, the 
state may require private or semi-private ISPs to implement the blocking as part of their 
service.  The technical complexities presented by URL become non-trivial as the number 
of users grows to millions rather than tens of thousands.  Some states appear to have 
limited overall access to the Internet in order to keep URL filtering manageable.  The 
                                                 
5 See Deibert et al., ACCESS DENIED, supra note 4. 
6 http://ice.citizenlab.org/index.php?p=78  
7 For instance, IP filtering forces the choice of blocking all sites sharing an IP address. A recent ONI 
bulletin found over 3,000 web sites blocked in an attempt to prevent access to only 31. (see 
http://www.opennetinitiative.net/bulletins/009/).  DNS blocking requires an entire domain and all 
subdomains to be either wholly blocked or wholly unblocked. (http://ice.citizenlab.org/index.php?p=78) 
  6government of Saudi Arabia, for example, made the ability to filter a pre-requisite of 
public Internet access, delaying any such access for a period of several years until the 
resources to filter were fully in place. 
 
Citizens with technical knowledge can generally circumvent filters that a state has put in 
place.  Some states acknowledge as much: the overseer of Saudi Arabia’s filtering 
program, via the state-run Internet Services Unit, admits that technically savvy users can 
simply not be stopped from accessing blocked content.  Expatriates in China, as well as 
those citizens who resist the state’s control, frequently find up-to-date proxy servers 
through which to connect to the Internet and through which they can evade filters in the 
process.  While no state will ultimately win a game of cat-and-mouse with those citizens 
who are resourceful and dedicated enough to employ circumvention measures, many 
users will never do so—rendering filtering regimes at least partially effective despite the 
obvious workarounds. 
 
Pause here.  Some of the earliest theorizing about control in the online environment 
suggested that such state-run control of Internet activity would not work.  It’s important 
to note that states such as China have proven that an ambitious state can, by devoting 
substantial technical, financial, and human resources, exert a large measure of control 
over what their citizens do online.  States, if they want, can erect certain forms of gates at 
their borders, even in cyberspace and can render them effective through a wide variety of 
modes of control.
8   
 
That does not mean that the issue is simple.  For starters, states ordinarily need a great 
deal of help in carrying out filtering and surveillance regimes.  Enter Internet Service 
Providers, many of whom require a license from the government in order to provide 
Internet access to citizens lawfully.  Much Internet filtering is effected by these private 
ISPs under respective states’ jurisdictions, though some governments partially centralize 
the filtering operation at private Internet Exchange Points⎯topological crossroads for 
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WORLD (Oxford University Press, 2006), 65 - 86.  
  7network traffic⎯or through explicit state-run clearing points established to serve as 
gatekeepers for Internet traffic.  Some governments implement filtering at public Internet 
access points such as the computers found within cybercafés.  Such filtering can take the 
form of software used in many American libraries and schools for filtering purposes, or 
“normative” filtering – government-encouraged interventions by shop owners and others 
as citizens surf the Internet in a public place. 
 
Sometimes the technical control is not enough.  The exercise of more traditional state 
powers can have a meaningful impact on Internet usage that does not require the 
complete technical inaccessibility of particular categories of content.  China, Vietnam, 
Syria, and Iran have each jailed “cyber-dissidents.”
9  Against this backdrop, the blocking 
of Web pages may be intended to deliver a message to users that state officials monitor 
Internet usage—in other words, making it clear to citizens that “someone is watching 
what you do online.”  This message is reinforced by methods allowing information to be 
gathered about what sites a particular user has visited after the fact, such as the 
requirement of passports to set up accounts with ISPs and tighter controls of users at 
cybercafés.   
 
As we learn more and more about how Internet filtering takes place, the problems of 
“governing” the Internet come more sharply into relief—about how control is exerted, 
about how citizens in one state can or cannot connect to others in another state, about the 
relationship between each state and its citizens, and about the relationships between 
states. 
 
2.2   Types of Content Filtered. 
 
                                                 
9 Iran: Reporters Sans Frontières, “Appeal court confirms prison for cyber-dissident while blogger is re-
imprisoned,” available at http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=12564 (Feb. 15, 2005) (“Javad Tavaf, 
a student leader and the editor of the popular news website Rangin Kaman, which for a year had been 
criticising the Guide of the Islamic Revolution, was arrested at his home on 16 January 2003 by people who 
said they were from the military judiciary, which later denied it had arrested him.”). China: Reporters Sans 
Frontières, Internet - China, available at http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=10749. Vietnam: 
Reporters Sans Frontières, Internet - Vietnam, available http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=10778. 
  8Around the world, states are blocking access to information online based upon its 
content—or what applications hosted at certain sites can do—for political, religious, and 
social reasons.  Sensitivities within these categories vary greatly from country to country.  
Not surprisingly, these sensitivities track, to large extent, local conflicts.  The Internet 
content blocked for social reasons—commonly pornography, information about gay and 
lesbian issues, and sex education information—is more likely to be the same across 
countries than the political and religious information to which access is blocked. 
 
Several states carry out extensive filtering on certain topics, where our OpenNet Initiative 
testing has shown that 50% or more of the sites we tested on a given topic—say, sex 
education; or in terms of applications, anonymization tools—are inaccessible.  Very 
rarely does any state manage to achieve complete filtering on any topic.  The only areas 
in which 100% filtering is approached are pornography and anonymizers (sites that if 
themselves unfiltered would defeat filtering of other sites by allowing a user to access 
any Internet destination through the anonymizers’ gateways).  States like Burma, which 
reportedly listen in on e-mail traffic, also block a high percentage of free e-mail service 
providers.  Such complete, or near complete, filtering is additionally only found in 
countries that have outsourced the task of identifying pornographic sites to one of several 
for-profit American companies, and is inevitably accompanied by over-blocking.   
Outside of these three areas, OpenNet Initiative testers are consistently able to access 
some material of a similar nature to the sites that were being blocked. 
 
2.3  Filtering and Over-breadth. 
 
Wholly apart from the propriety of extensive government censorship as a threshold 
matter, Internet filtering is almost impossible to accomplish with any degree of precision.  
There is no way to stem the global flow of information in a consistently accurate fashion.  
A country that is deciding to filter the Internet must make an “over-broad” or “under-
broad” decision at the outset.  The filtering regime will either block access to too much or 
too little Internet content.  Very often, this decision is tied to whether to use a home-
grown system or whether to adopt a commercial software product, such as SmartFilter, 
  9WebSense, or an offering from security provider Fortinet, each of which are products 
made in the United States and are believed to be licensed to countries that filter the 
Internet.  Bahrain, for instance, has opted for an “under-broad” solution for pornography; 
its ISPs appear to block access to a small and essentially fixed number of “black-listed” 
sites.  Bahrain may seek to indicate disapproval of access to pornographic material 
online, while actually blocking only token access to such material.  The United Arab 
Emirates, by contrast, seems to have made the opposite decision by attempting to block 
much more extensively in similar categories, thereby sweeping into its filtering basket a 
number of sites that appear to have innocuous content by any metric.  And Yemen was 
rebuked by WebSense for allegedly using the company’s filtering system to block access 
to material that was not pornographic in nature, contrary to the company’s policies.
10 
 
Most of the time, states make blocking determinations to cover a range of Web content, 
commonly grouped around a second-level domain name or the IP address of a Web 
service (such as http://www.twitter.com or 66.102.15.100), rather than based on the 
precise URL of a given Web page (such as http://www.twitter.com/username), or a subset 
of content found on that page (such as a particular image or string of text).  Iran, for 
instance, has used such an approach to block a cluster of weblogs that the state prefers 
not to have reach its citizens.  This approach means that the filtering process will often 
not distinguish between permissible and impermissible content so long as any 
impermissible content is deemed “nearby” from a network standpoint. 
 
Because of this wholesale acceptance or rejection of a particular speaker or site, it is 
difficult to know exactly what speech was deemed unacceptable for citizens to access.  
It’s even harder to ascertain why, exactly, the speech is blocked. Bahrain, a country in 
which we only found a handful of blocked sites at the outset of our first round of testing, 
blocked access to a discussion board at http://www.bahrainonline.org.  The message 
board likely contains a combination of messages that would be tolerated independently as 
well as some that would appear to meet the state’s criteria for filtering.  Likewise, we 
                                                 
10 See http://opennet.net/blog/2009/08/websense-bars-yemens-government-further-software-updates (last 
accessed November 6, 2009). 
  10found minimal blocking for internal political purposes in the UAE, but the state did block 
a site that essentially acted as a catalog of criticism of the state.  Our tests can not 
determine whether it was the material covering human rights abuses or discussion of 
historical border disputes with Iran, but in as much as the discussion of these topics is 
taking place within a broad dissention-based site, the calculation we project onto the 
censor in UAE looks significantly different than that for a site with a different ratio of 
“offensive” to approved content. 
 
For those states using commercial filtering software and update services to try to 
maintain a current list of blocked sites matching particular criteria, we have noted 
multiple instances where such software has mistaken sites containing gay and lesbian 
content for pornography.  For instance, the site for the Log Cabin Republicans of Texas 
was blocked by the U.S.-based SmartFilter as pornography, apparently the basis for its 
blocking by the United Arab Emirates.  (Our research shows that gay and lesbian content 
is itself often targeted for filtering, and even when it is not explicitly targeted, states may 
not be overly concerned with its unavailability.)
11 
 
As content changes increasingly quickly on the Web and generalizations become more 
difficult to make by URL or domain—thanks in part to the rise of simpler, faster, and 
aggregated publishing tools, like those found on weblog sites—accurate filtering is likely 
to get trickier for filtering regimes to address over time unless they want to take the step 
of banning nearly everything. 
 
For example, free web hosting domains tend to group an enormous array of changing 
content and thus provoke very different responses from state governments.  In 2004, 
Saudi Arabia blocked every page we tested on http://freespace.virgin.net and 
www.erols.com.
12 However, our research indicated the www.erols.com sites had been 
only minimally blocked in 2002, and the http://freespace.virgin.net sites had been 
blocked in 2002, but accessible in 2003 before being re-blocked in 2004.  In all three 
                                                 
 
12 Saudi Arabia blocked every page on www.erols.com except for the root page at www.erols.com itself, 
potentially indicating a desire to manage perceptions as to the extent of the blocking. 
  11tests, Saudi Arabia practiced by-URL blocking on www.geocities.com (possibly through 
SmartFilter categorization), only blocking 3% of over a thousand sites tested in 2004. 
Vietnam blocked all sites we tested on the www.geocities.com and members.tripod.org 
domains.  In our recent testing, we have found that Turkey and Syria have been blocking 
all of Blogspot’s hosted blogging service.
13  
 
China’s response to the same problem provides an instructive contrast.  When China 
became worried about bloggers, they shut down the main blogging domains for a period 
of weeks in the summer of 2004.  When the domains came back on-line, the blogging 
systems contained filters that would reject posts containing particular keywords.
14  Even 
Microsoft’s MSN Spaces blogs software blocked writers from publishing terms like 
“democracy” from China.  In effect, China moved to a content-based filtering system, but 
determined that the best place for such content evaluation was not the point of Web page 
access but the point of publication, and possessed the authority to force these filters on 
the downstream application provider.  This approach is similar to that taken with Google 
to respond to the accessibility of disfavored content via Google’s caching function. 
Google was blocked in China until a mechanism was put in place to prevent cache 
access.
15  These examples make clear the length to which regimes can go to preserve 
“good” access instead of simply blocking an entire service.  
 
These examples also demonstrate the increasing reliance by states on “just-in-time” 
filtering, rather than filtering that occurs in the same, constant way over time.  While the 
paradigmatic case of Internet filtering was initially the state that wished to block its 
citizens from viewing any pornography online at any time (for instance, Saudi Arabia), 
the phenomenon of a state blocking particular speech or types of speech at a sensitive 
moment has become commonplace.  For instance, the Chinese state blocked applications 
such as Twitter and YouTube at the time of the 20
th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square 
demonstrations in June, 2009.  A few weeks later, the Iranian state blocked similar 
                                                 
13 All data from OpenNet Initiative testing can be found in the country-by-country summaries at 
http://www.opennet.net/. 
14 http://www.opennetinitiative.net/bulletins/008/  
15 This mechanism turned out to be extremely rudimentary, as outlined a previous ONI bulletin 
(http://www.opennetinitiative.net/bulletins/006/).  
  12applications, including Facebook, at the time of demonstrations in the streets of Tehran.  
These blocks are often lifted once the trouble has past.  One means of tracking these 
changes in the availability of applications and web sites is a project called Herdict.org, 
which enables people from around the world to submit reports on what they can and 
cannot access in real-time.
16 
 
Alternate approaches that demand a finer-grained means of filtering, such as the use of 
automated keywords to identify and expunge sensitive information on the fly, or greater 
manual involvement in choosing individual Web pages to be filtered, are possible so long 
as a state is willing to invest in them.  China in particular appears to be prepared to make 
such investment, one mirrored by choices demonstrated about more traditional media.  
For example, China allows CNN to be broadcast within the country with a form of time 
delay, so the feed can be temporarily turned off when, in one case, stories about the death 
of Zhao Ziyang were broadcast.
17  The global flow of information is tempered by the 
ingenuity of the censors, expressed through technical controls at many layers. 
 
 
2.4  Law and Soft Controls. 
 
Just as dozens of states use technical means to block citizens from accessing content on 
the Internet, most also employ legal and other “soft” means of control.  Many states that 
filter use a combination of media, telecommunications, national security, and Internet-
specific laws and regulatory schemes to restrict the publication of and access to 
information on the Internet.  States often require Internet Service Providers to obtain 
licenses before providing Internet access to citizens.  Some states—China and Turkey, for 
instance, which have each enacted special regulations to this effect—apply pressure on 
cybercafés and Internet Service Providers to monitor Internet usage by their customers.  
With the exceptions of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, no country seems explicitly to 
communicate to the public about its process for blocking and unblocking content on the 
                                                 
16 See http://www.herdict.org, the brainchild of Harvard’s Jonathan Zittrain.  The histories of reports of 
these just-in-time blocking patterns can be viewed from this website. 
17 See http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/blogs/gems/tka/EPriestReactionPaper2.pdf  
  13Internet.  Most countries, instead, have a series of broad laws that cover content issues 
online, both empowering states that need it to carry out filtering regimes and putting 
citizens on general notice not to publish or to access content online that violates certain 
norms. 
 
Often these soft controls are exercised through social norms or through control at the far 
edges of the network.  Sometimes the state requires non-governmental organizations and 
religious leaders to register before using the Internet to communicate about the topics 
they work on.  In China and in parts of Central Asia, very often the most fearsome 
enforcer of the state’s will is the old woman on one’s block, who may or may not be on 
the state’s payroll.  The control might be exercised, as in Singapore, largely through 
family dynamics.  The call by a local police force to the Malaysian blogger to come and 
talk about his publishing to the web might have as much of an effect on expression as any 
law on the books or technical blocking system. 
 
Whether through advanced information technology, legal mechanisms, or soft controls, a 
growing number of states around the world are seeking to control the global flow of 
information.  Ordinarily, this control takes the form of blocking, through technical means, 
that state’s citizens from accessing certain information online.  In other instances, the 
blocking stops the state’s citizens from publishing information online, in effect 
disallowing people outside the state from hearing the voices of the state’s citizens.  Most 
filtering regimes cause a chilling effect on the use of information technologies as a means 
of free expression, whether for political, religious, or cultural purposes. 
 
3.0  Transparency in Filtering as the Focus of the Internet Governance Debate. 
 
The Internet governance debate could profitably take up the issue of filtering on the net.  
The practice of filtering is now a widely-known fact, but the hard problems that stem 
from this practice are infrequently discussed as a matter of public policy.  The blocking 
and surveillance of citizens’ activity on the Internet—by virtue of the network’s 
architecture, an issue of international dimensions—calls for discussion at a multi-lateral 
  14level.  Rather than fretting over the finer points of the domain name system, time would 
be better spent in Internet governance discussions considering rules that relate, for 
instance, to specific issues like transparency in Internet filtering or to broad issues of 
interconnection of the global network.  The Internet filtering problem offers much more 
to be gained—even through frank discussion, if not action—and provides an exercise 
worthy of an extraordinary gathering of world leaders who want to talk about the global 
“Information Society.” 
 
There is certainly an argument to be made that Internet filtering is a private matter 
between a state and its citizens as to what information citizens may access online.
18  
States that censor the Internet assert the right to sovereignty.  From the state’s 
perspective, the public interest, as defined in one state, say Saudi Arabia, is different from 
the public interest as defined by the state in Uzbekistan, or in China, or in the United 
Kingdom.  States can, and do, exercise their sovereignty through control of the 
information environment. 
 
Even if true, that argument should not end the conversation about Internet filtering.  A 
global discussion about the relationship between these filtering and surveillance practices 
and human rights could be extremely fruitful.  In specific, states might consider rules that 
relate to common standards for transparency in Internet filtering and surveillance 
practices as they relate to individuals and those corporations drawn into the process.  On 
broader level, the issue raised here is about interconnection between states and the 
citizens of those states—and ultimately about what sort of an Internet we want to be 
building and whether the global flow of information is a sustainable vision.   
 
For instance, we have yet to join the ethical interests at play in filtering.  States vary 
greatly in terms of how explicitly the filtering regime is discussed and the amount that 
                                                 
18 Some states make an effort to suggest that their citizens (in Saudi Arabia and the UAE specifically) are 
largely in support of the filtering regime, particularly when it comes to blocking access to pornographic 
material.  For instance, the agency responsible for both internet access and filtering in Saudi Arabia 
conducted a user study in 1999, and reported that 45% of respondents thought “too much” was blocked, 
41% thought it “reasonable,” and 14% found it “not enough.”   These studies stand for the proposition, in 
the context of our report, that some states that filter seek to make the case that their filtering regime enjoys 
popular support, not that such support necessarily exists. 
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citizens can come to know about it.  No state that we studied makes its block list 
generally available.
19   The world leaders who gather periodically at United Nations-
sponsored meetings and at the Internet Governance Forums could make the most of their 
leadership by taking up the mantle of seeking to establish a set of principles and best 
practices related to Internet filtering and the transparency related to filtering regimes. 
They might also focus profitably on the difficult problems facing those multinational 
companies that do business in regimes that require them to filter and support surveillance 
of the network in ways that would not be legally permissible in the company’s home 
jurisdiction.   
 
This broader vision of Internet filtering – about what sort of a future we seek for the 
Internet – is just the sort of topic on which the Internet governance debate ought to focus.   
Even though Internet filtering is hard to talk about as part of a global conversation, it is 
important that we do so.   The net is becoming each day larger and more fractured.  
Trends in favor of more speech from more people in more places around the globe – 
using web 2.0 applications generally, such as blogs, wikis, Twitter, SMS, podcasting, and 
so forth – are countered by the increasing sophistication and reach of Internet filtering 
and surveillance practices.  A richer understanding of the complexities at play in Internet 
filtering would help develop a foundation that does not yet exist for building a 
sustainable, and truly global, network. 
 
19 Saudi Arabia publishes its rationale and its blocking practices on an easily accessible web site, at 
http://www.isu.net.sa/saudi-internet/contenet-filtring/filtring.htm (“The Internet Services Unit oversees and 
implements the filtration of web pages in order to block those pages of an offensive or harmful nature to the 
society, and which violate the tenants of the Islamic religion or societal norms.  This service is offered in 
fulfillment of the directions of the government of Saudi Arabia and under the direction of the Permanent 
Security Committee chaired by the Ministry of the Interior.”).  In Saudi Arabia, citizens may suggest sites 
for blocking or for unblocking, in either Arabic or English, via a public web site.  Most sites include a 
block-page, indicating to those seeking to access a web site that they have reached a disallowed site.  Most 
states have enacted laws that support the filtering regime and provide citizens with some context for why 
and how it is occurring, though rarely with any degree of precision.  As among the states we have studied, 
China seems to obscure the nature and extent of its filtering regime to the greatest extent.   